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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Nicholas James Longee appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of 
grand theft by possession of stolen property, unlawful possession of a firearm, 
solicitation of grand theft by disposing of stolen property, and a persistent violator 
enhancement. Longee argues his judgment of conviction should be reversed 
because the district court committed fundamental error in an instruction to the 
jury, and because evidence at trial was insufficient to establish his persistent 
violator charge. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In March 2012, five handguns were stolen from William Tharp's home in 
Buhl, Idaho. (UPSI, p. 1; Trial Tr., p. 137, L. 9 - p. 138, L. 9; p. 139, L. 20 - p. 
145, L. 14; p. 146, L. 20 - p. 147, L. 24.) A couple days after the burglary, 
Nicholas James Longee phoned Kenneth Worth, who lived in the room next to 
Longee's in their half-way house. (Trial Tr., p. 186, L. 22 - p. 187, L. 19; p. 188, 
Ls. 16-24.) Longee asked Worth for help selling five guns that were in a 
pillowcase in a ditch out in the country. (Trial Tr., p. 189, L. 10 - p. 190, L. 6.) 
Worth declined. (Trial Tr., p. 189, L. 24 - p. 190, L. 2.) Longee then asked 
Worth to take him to Omar Padilla's house, and Worth did. (Trial Tr., p. 191, Ls. 
4-8.) 
Longee knew Padilla because they had served time together in jail. (Trial 
Tr., p., 216, Ls. 20-25.) Longee asked Padilla to take him to Filer to "pick up 
some thumpers." (PSI, p. 13; Trial Tr., p. 217, L. 18- p. 218, L. 1; p. 221, Ls. 7-
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13.) Padilla believed "thumpers" referred to car stereo speakers. (Trial Tr., p. 
222, Ls. 8-13.) Padilla's girlfriend, Ashtyn Jones, drove Longee and Padilla to 
Filer in her car. (PSI, p. 13; Trial Tr., p. 218, Ls. 8-9; p. 221, Ls. 23-25; p. 223, 
Ls. 3-4; p. 276, Ls. 7-20.) Longee gave driving directions; when Longee said to 
stop the car, he got out and retrieved a pillowcase from a ditch. (Trial Tr., p. 223, 
Ls. 4-24; p. 226, Ls. 17-24; p. 230, L. 23 - p. 231, L. 21; p. 277, Ls. 4-11; p. 280, 
L. 25 - p. 281, L. 3.) 
The three drove back to Twin Falls, and Longee said to go to the YMCA 
so he could show Padilla the "thumpers." (Trial Tr., p. 230, Ls. 3-9.) At the 
YMCA, Longee showed Padilla the contents of the pillowcase - five guns. (Trial 
Tr., p. 230, L. 14 - p. 231, L. 1 O; p. p. 281, L. 23 - p. 282, L. 5.) The guns were 
the five that had been stolen from Tharp's home. (Trial Tr., p. 139, L. 20 - p. 
145, L. 14; p. 231, Ls. 11-15.) Jones heard Longee say "45 and 22" and 
believed he was talking about guns. (Trial Tr., p. 230, L. 23 - p. 231, L. 4; p. 
283, Ls. 2-11.) Longee then asked Padilla to sell four of the guns in exchange 
for keeping the fifth. (Trial Tr., p. 232, Ls. 2-10.) 
Padilla told Longee he agreed to the plan, fearing Longee's reaction if he 
refused. (Trial Tr., p. 234, Ls. 1-7.) But after dropping Longee off, Padilla told 
Jones he did not want to "get in trouble for having" the guns. (Trial Tr., p. 235, 
Ls. 8-10.) Padilla talked to an off-duty police officer whose girlfriend he knew, 
then led police to the guns. (Trial Tr., p. 237, L. 4 - p. 238, L. 6.) Over the next 
day or two, Longee called Padilla a number of times about the guns, and 
eventually, Padilla told Longee he had turned them in to police. (Trial Tr., p. 238, 
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Ls. 15-25.) Longee told Padilla he had a week to give him $500, and instructed 
Padilla to delete their communications from his cell phone, which Padilla did. 
(Trial Tr., p. 239, Ls. 1-15.) 
Longee, representing himself at trial, testified on his own behalf and told a 
different story. (Trial Tr., p. 378, L. 10 - p. 385, L. 4.) According to Longee, he 
called Worth for help buying a car stereo. (Trial Tr., p. 379, Ls. 21-25.) Worth 
put Longee in touch with Padilla, who Longee happened to know from a rider 
program. (Trial Tr., p. 380, Ls. 1-6.) Longee testified that Padilla said he had 
car speakers for sale, but they would need to get them in Filer, and Padilla did 
not want his girlfriend to know what they were doing. (Trial Tr., p. 380, L. 12 - p. 
381, L. 4.) Longee testified that Padilla told him where the speakers were; 
Longee then explained that he knew the area because his mother lives in Filer, 
therefore he gave Jones directions where to drive. (Trial Tr., p. 381, L. 21 - p. 
382, L. 5.) 
Longee grabbed the pillowcase out of the ditch, but testified he believed it 
contained a speaker, not a box with guns in it. (Trial Tr., p. 382, Ls. 12-20.) 
According to Longee, they returned to town and were driving around in circles, so 
he suggested they stop at the YMCA pool so he could look at the speakers. 
(Trial Tr., p. 383, Ls. 5-19.) When Padilla opened the bag, Longee asserts he 
expressed surprise, saying, "Oh crap. That's a .22. That's a .45." (Trial Tr., p. 
384, Ls. 4-5.) Longee testified that Padilla asked him to hold on to the guns for 
him, and Longee refused. (Trial Tr., p. 384, Ls. 11-15.) Longee then testified 
that, even though he lived right across the street from the YMCA, Padilla insisted 
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that Jones give Longee a ride home in her car. (Trial Tr., p. 384, L. 16 - p. 385, 
L. 1.) 
At trial, a jury found Longee guilty of grand theft by possession of stolen 
property, unlawful possession of a firearm, solicitation of grand theft by disposing 
of stolen property, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 258-61.) The 
district court sentenced Longee to a term of twenty years with five years fixed on 
count one, to run concurrently with five-year fixed terms on counts two and three. 
(R. p. 294.) Longee timely appealed. (R., pp. 306-08.) 
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ISSUES 
Longee states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court commit fundamental error, in violation 
of Mr. Longee's Fifth, Sixth, And Fourteenth Amendment 
right to testify at trial, when it instructed the jury that he was 
not a witness and that nothing he said was evidence? 
2. Must the persistent violator finding be vacated because it 
was not supported by sufficient evidence? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Longee failed to establish the district court's jury instruction in 
question amounted to fundamental error, in light of the record? 
2. Given Longee's admissions and certified copies of his convictions, did 
substantial evidence establish the essential elements of Longee's 
persistent violator charge at trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
In Light Of The Record, Longee Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Jury 
Instruction In Question Amounted To Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Longee argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury about what 
was not evidence. Longee did not object to the alleged error at trial, but now 
asserts the error violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Longee fails to satisfy his burden on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Generally, issues must be raised before the trial court to be considered on 
appeal. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). An 
exception applies for unobjected-to error depriving a criminal defendant of due 
process. Id.; State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 820, 229 P.3d 1179, 1182 
(2010). To establish such fundamental error, an appellant must demonstrate: (1) 
violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the error is clear and 
obvious without need to further develop the record; and (3) that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 
(2010). This three-prong test applies where the unobjected-to error concerns 
jury instructions, as here. State v. Calver, _ P.3d _, 2013 WL 2396726 at *5 
(Ct. App. 2013). 
6 
C. The Record And Instructions As A Whole Fail To Support A Clear 
Violation Of A Constitutional Right 
The disputed jury instruction addressed what is not evidence. Although 
taken from the model jury instructions, the trial court modified it to reflect that 
Longee was representing himself in lieu of an attorney: 
Certain things you have heard and seen are not evidence, 
including: . . . arguments and statements by lawyers, or in this 
case, Mr. Longee. The lawyers and Mr. Longee are not witnesses. 
What they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and 
at other times is intended to help you interpret the evidence but is 
not evidence. If the facts as you remember them differ from the 
way the lawyers or Mr. Longee have stated them, follow your 
memory ... 
(Trial Tr., p. 469, L. 21 - p. 470, L. 6; p. 476, L. 25 - p. 477, L. 5. 1) According to 
Longee, this instruction violated his constitutional right to testify at trial. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-11.) Noting that he exercised this right, Longee argues 
the court's instruction prohibited the jury from considering his testimony "for any 
purpose other than 'to help interpret the evidence."' (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) 
On review of jury instructions, the appellate courts consider "whether the 
instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect 
applicable law." State v. Skunkcap. 2013 WL 2714563 at *5 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(citing State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. App. 
1993)). The reason for examining jury instructions as a whole is "because an 
ambiguity in one instruction may be made clear by other instructions, and an 
instruction that appears incomplete when viewed in isolation may fairly and 
accurately reflect the law when read together with the remaining instructions." 
1 See ICJI 202 (Determining Facts From The Evidence And Disregarding Non-
Evidence). 
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Skunkcap, at *5 (citing State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,472, 272 P.3d 417,444 
(2012)). 
Longee highlights the trial court's ambiguous wording, "The lawyers and 
Mr. Longee are not witnesses." (Appellant's brief, p. 9; Trial Tr., p. 469, Ls. 24-
25.) Longee also cites the instructions immediately before and after the disputed 
instruction, which would bar consideration of Longee's testimony if Longee is 
deemed strictly a non-witness. (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) However, in arguing that 
the instructions violated his rights, he astutely avoids examining the instructions 
as a whole, instead interpreting isolated phrases without context. Interpreting 
the instructions as a whole, Longee is a non-witness in the same way that the 
lawyers are non-witnesses. 
The phrase "lawyers, or in this case, Mr. Longee" provides the 
instruction's context; it refers to Longee in his capacity as his own representative. 
Thus, when acting as his own representative, Longee is not a witness. (See 
Trial Tr., p. 469, Ls. 24-25.) When acting as his own representative, Longee's 
"opening statements, closing arguments and [statements] at other times" are not 
evidence. (See Trial Tr., p. 470, Ls. 1-4.) "Other times" refers to questions of 
other witnesses posed by Longee, as his own representative, or any other 
statement by Longee when not testifying as a witness. 
Indeed, Longee does not assert that he was prevented from exercising his 
right to testify. Instead, he argues the instruction erroneously informed the jury 
that "he was not a witness and that nothing he said was evidence." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 11.) The record and trial transcript, viewed as a whole, support the 
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correct and intended meaning of the trial court's instruction. When Longee 
testified, the trial court explained: 
Ladies and gentlemen, it's very awkward for a person who 
represents themselves to present testimony. So basically, ... Mr. 
Longee is going to ask himself a question and then give an answer. 
And the reason that we do that is so that Mr. Holloway can object if 
he thinks that the questions are improper. 
(Trial Tr., p. 378, Ls. 10-20.) The jury instruction thus informed the jury that 
Longee's questions were not evidence, but his answers were. In the state's 
closing and rebuttal, the prosecution referred to Longee's testimony as evidence 
supporting the state's case. (Trial Tr., p. 499, Ls. 12-15; p. 500, Ls. 12-16; p. 
513, Ls. 21-25.) 
Ultimately, it is far from clear that the jurors erroneously understood the 
instruction as a directive from the court to disregard Longee's testimony. For a 
court to find that the jurors interpreted the instruction in this way, the record 
would need to be developed further. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978). 
Longee has not shown a clear error rising to the level of a constitutional violation, 
thus he fails to establish the first two prongs under Perry. 
D. Longee Has Failed To Show That Error, If Any, Affected The Outcome Of 
His Case 
Longee also cannot meet his burden of showing the error affected the 
outcome of his case. See State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106,113,266 P.3d 1211, 
1218 (Ct. App. 2011). Longee's testimony, as summarized in the statement of 
facts above, was arguably more damaging than helpful. 
According to Longee, it was Padilla who led him out to the countryside, 
despite that Longee admitted he gave the driving directions to Jones. (Trial Tr., 
9 
p. 380, L. 12 - p. 381, L. 4; p. 381, L 21 - p. 382, L. 5.) Longee alleged that 
Padilla had promised car speakers, but inexplicably, retrieved guns instead. (Id.) 
Longee's testimony carefully accounted for all the various calls made, so as to 
match the phone record he admitted into evidence. (Trial Tr., p. 365, L. 23; p. 
380, Ls. 5-11, 20-23.) But ultimately, Longee's testimony was self-serving and 
incredible, if not implausible. 
Responding to Longee's attempts to discredit Padilla and Worth, the 
prosecution acknowledged the witnesses' criminal histories, stating, "I told you 
from the very beginning that this was a case that ... didn't involve choir boys or 
boy scouts." (Trial Tr., p. 514, Ls. 14-17.) But Padilla had turned the guns in to 
the police. (Trial Tr., p. 237, L. 4 - p. 238, L. 6.) As the prosecution noted, there 
was no evidence of bad blood between Padilla and Longee, thus Longee failed 
to establish a motive for Padilla to lie to get Longee in trouble. (Trial Tr., p. 514, 
L. 21 - p. 515, L. 4.) 
Testimonies by Jones, Padilla, and Worth were consistent with each 
other, and consistent with the prosecution's theory of the case. Longee's 
testimony was not. Longee has not shown that, absent the ambiguous jury 
instruction, the jury would have returned a different verdict. Accordingly, Longee 
has failed to establish fundamental error. 
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II. 
Given Longee's Admissions And Certified Copies Of His Convictions, Substantial 
Evidence Established The Essential Elements Of Longee's Persistent Violator 
Charge At Trial 
A. Introduction 
Longee argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding 
on his persistent violator charge. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-17.) According to 
Longee, the only evidence to support his persistent violator enhancement was 
certified copies of two burglary convictions. (Appellant's brief, p. 13; Trial Tr., p. 
327, Ls. 1-17; p. 329, Ls. 4-6, 20-22.) Longee thus argues the enhancement 
should be vacated. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-17.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate review of issues concerning the sufficiency of evidence is 
limited in scope. State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 905, 994 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Ct. 
App. 2000). Judgment entered on a jury's verdict will not be disturbed where 
there is substantial evidence to support a reasonable determination the state 
established a crime's essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. kt 
(citations omitted). The appellate court considers the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the state and will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury 
regarding witness credibility, the weight given to testimony, or inferences drawn 
from the evidence. kt 
C. The Undisputed Evidence At Trial Established The Essential Elements Of 
Longee's Persistent Violator Charge Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
Idaho's persistent violator statute provides that "[a]ny person convicted for 
the third time of the commission of a felony ... shall be considered a persistent 
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violator of law .... " I.C. § 19-2514. The essential elements of the persistent 
violator enhancement that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, 
were that Longee had two prior felony convictions. As Longee acknowledges, 
the state introduced certified copies of his felony burglary convictions, which 
were admitted at trial. (Appellant's brief, p. 13; State's exhibits 41, 42; Trial Tr., 
p. 327, Ls. 1-17; p. 329, Ls. 4-6, 20-22; p. 385, Ls. 13-25; see also PSI, pp. 27, 
30.) In addition, Longee admitted pleading guilty to the two prior felony 
burglaries in his trial testimony. (Trial Tr., p. 418, L. 22 - p. 419, L. 6.) Thus 
there was ample evidence on which a reasonable fact-finder could determine the 
necessary elements for a persistent violator enhancement were met. 
In arguing the finding should be vacated, Longee attempts to expand the 
"essential elements" of a persistent violator enhancement under the court's ruling 
in State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 715 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1986), and its 
progeny. In Brandt, the court recognized a general rule that felony convictions 
entered the same day, or charged in the same information, should count as a 
single conviction for purposes of a persistent violator charge. & at 344, 715 
P.2d at 1014. "However, the nature of the convictions in any given situation 
must be examined to make certain that the general rule is appropriate." & This 
examination is necessary, the Brandt court reasoned, in light of the purpose of 
the persistent violator statute - "to punish repeat offenders by making their 
sentences for successive crimes more harsh." & 
The Brandt analysis - whether to treat prior felony convictions as one - is 
conducted by the trial coutt. State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 568, 990 P.2d 
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144, 149 (Ct. App. 1999). It is not an essential element of the crime to be 
determined by the jury. The essential elements of the persistent violator 
enhancement were supported by substantial evidence, thus there is no basis on 
which to overturn Longee's judgment as to the enhancement. Because Longee 
has raised no challenge to the district court's decision, as a matter of law, to 
submit the persistent violator charge to the jury, he may not at this stage assert 
it. See State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337, 338, 971 P .2d 1161, 1162 (Ct. App. 1998); 
Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 877, 187 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm Longee's judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 30th day of July, 2013. 
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